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BRIEFINGS

Bad io_uring: A New Era of Rooting for Android

Zhenpeng Lin, Xinyu Xing, Zhaofeng Chen, Kang Li

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Who We Are

• Zhenpeng Lin

- Ph.D. from Northwestern University
- Specialized in *kernel security*
- Xinyu Xing
 - Associate Professor at Northwestern University


Zhaofeng Chen

- Principle Researcher at *Certik*
- Kang Li
 - Chief Security Officer at *Certik*



The io_uring

- Efficient I/O operations
- Less Syscalls
- Under ACTIVE development









"Why io_uring so bad?"

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The BAD io_uring

• Very buggy



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The BAD io_uring

Very buggy



"Why io_uring so bad?"

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syzbot Linux ~	io_uring	17/161	^	×	
I Subsystems I Fixed [4669] ■ Subsystems	🏽 Invalid [10858]	✓ Kernel Health	<mark>≁</mark> Bug	g Lifeti	n



The BAD io_uring


- Very buggy
- Active development, and ACTIVE exploitation



"Why io_uring so bad?"

\leftarrow \rightarrow C \triangle $($ \triangleq syzkaller.appspot.com/upstream	n/fixed		Q	Û	${\leftrightarrow}$
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- <u>60% submissions</u> to <u>KCTF VRP</u> exploited io_uring as of June 2023
- Around 1 million USD paid out for those bugs
- All public exploits targeted desktop Linux kernel



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- All public exploits targeted desktop Linux kernel
- Measures taken by Google
 - ChromeOS: io_uring disabled
 - Google servers: io_uring disabled
 - GKE AutoPilot: investigating disabling io_uring by default
 - Android: io_uring *restricted*



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- Around 1 million USD paid out for those bugs
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- Measures taken by Google
 - ChromeOS: io_uring disabled
 - Google servers: io_uring disabled
 - GKE AutoPilot: investigating disabling io_uring by default
 - Android: io_uring *restricted*
 - still accessible from *privileged* context (e.g., adb)



Exploiting io_uring on Android

• A lot of bugs, a lot of potential!



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- A lot of bugs, a lot of potential!
- 🤓 Fun and profit!

Code execution reward amounts		
Description	Maximum Reward	
Pixel Titan M with Persistence, Zero click	Up to \$1,000,000	
Pixel Titan M without Persistence, Zero click	Up to \$500,000	
Local App to Pixel Titan M without Persistence	Up to \$300,000	
Secure Element	Up to \$250,000	
Trusted Execution Environment	Up to \$250,000	
Kernel	Up to \$250,000	
Privileged Process	Up to \$100,000	

Code execution reward amounts

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Exploiting io_uring on Android

- A lot of bugs, a lot of potential!
- 🤓 Fun and profit!
- 😕 No public writeup for exploiting it on Android

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CVE-2022-20409


- No difference than other io_uring bugs
- A stable invalid-free bug
- The bug I used to pwn Google Pixel 6 and Samsung S22 in 2022
- <u>Fixed</u> on 7/29/2022





io_uring's AsynclO

- Each I/O operation is a *req* in the submission queue
- Each req can be processed *asynchronously*
- Each req has its *identity*






Initializing identity

• *identity* stores in *io_uring*

```
int io_uring_alloc_task_context(struct task_struct *task)
{
    struct io_uring_task *tctx;
    tctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*tctx), GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    io_init_identity(&tctx->__identity);
    tctx->identity = &tctx->__identity;
    task->io_uring = tctx;
}
```








Initializing identity

- *identity* stores in *io_uring*
- *identity* references to the nested ___*identity*

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```




io_uring



Initializing identity

- *identity* stores in *io_uring*
- *identity* references to the nested ___*identity*
- *io_uring* is referenced by *task*

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




identity COW

• If *identity* changes (e.g., cred changes), new *identity* is created

static bool io_identity_cow(struct io_kiocb *req) { struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring; struct io_identity *id; id = kmemdup(req->work.identity, sizeof(*id), GFP_KERNEL); io_init_identity(id); ...; req->work.identity = id; tctx->identity = id; }








identity COW

- If *identity* changes (e.g., cred changes), new *identity* is created
- *identity* * will reference to the new *identity* on heap

```
static bool io_identity_cow(struct io_kiocb *req)
{
    struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring;
    struct io_identity *id;
    ...
    id = kmemdup(req->work.identity, sizeof(*id),
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    io_init_identity(id);
    ...
    req->work.identity = id;
    tctx->identity = id;
}
```





•••

}

static bool io_identity_cow(struct io_kiocb *req)

struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring;

•••

/* drop tctx and req identity references, if needed */

if (tctx->identity != &tctx->__identity &&
 refcount_dec_and_test(&tctx->identity->count))
 kfree(tctx->identity);

if (req->work.identity != &tctx->__identity &&
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```
req->work.identity = id;
tctx->identity = id;
return true;
```



•••

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
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
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

























The Memory Corruption Capability

• Invalid-free a *kmalloc-256* object in the middle





Exploitation on Android

• Restricted Access

- No user_ns
- No FUSE, userfaultfd
- No msg_msg, user_key_payload, etc.
- Very limited choice of syscalls



Exploitation on Android

Restricted Access


- No user_ns
- No FUSE, userfaultfd
- No msg_msg, user_key_payload, etc.
- Very limited choice of syscalls
- But we have *pipe*⁽²⁾
 - pipe_buffer is an <u>elastic object</u> --- good for spraying
 - *pipe_buffer* contains a global pointer --- good for leaking

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struct pipe_buffer {
 struct page *page;
 unsigned int offset, len;
 const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops;
 unsigned int flags;
 unsigned long private;
}




Trigger the invalid-free of *identity*, which frees *io_uring_task* in the middle






- Trigger the invalid-free of *identity*, which frees *io_uring_task* in the middle
- Spray *pipe_buffer* in **kmalloc-256**






- Trigger the invalid-free of *identity*, which frees *io_uring_task* in the middle
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- Free *io_uring_task*, which frees *pipe_buffer*






- Trigger the invalid-free of *identity*, which frees *io_uring_task* in the middle
- Spray *pipe_buffer* in kmalloc-256
- Free *io_uring_task*, which frees *pipe_buffer*
- How to leak pipe_buffer out?





Recap of The io_uring Design

• The *ring buffer* is accessible to both userspace and kernel



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The Shared Ring

- User pages *shared* between kernel and userspace
- The memory is allocated by *buddy allocator* and mapped to userspace
- No copy_to/from_user is needed
- Date can be transported directly without copying
 - Read/write kernel memory from userspace
 - Read/write userspace memory from kernel




The "DirtyPage" Technique

- Some user pages are recycled with slab pages
 - Spraying pages to reclaim freed slab pages
 - Spray objects? No! We spray pages now!
 - Candidates: *io_uring, pipe*
- What is the advantage?
 - Powerful 🤓 : Read/write slab objects from userspace
 - Stable 🤓 : Spray once to have persist read/write on victim object
 - Simple 🤓 : Just allocate more




• Preparing the memory layout






- Preparing the memory layout
- Triggering the invalid-free






- Preparing the memory layout
- Triggering the invalid-free
- Freeing the slab page





- Preparing the memory layout
- Triggering the invalid-free
- Freeing the slab page
- Reclaiming the freed slab page





- Preparing the memory layout
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- Reclaiming the freed slab page
- Reading *pipe_buffer*
 - ops --- bypass kaslr

```
•••
```

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struct pipe_buffer {
    struct page *page;
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- Triggering the invalid-free
- Freeing the slab page
- Reclaiming the freed slab page
- Reading *pipe_buffer*
 - ops --- bypass kaslr
- Writing *pipe_buffer*
 - flags ---- Dirty Pipe Retro!
 - *page* --- **arbitrary r/w** on kernel memory?

•••

```
struct pipe_buffer {
    struct page *page;
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    unsigned int flags;
    unsigned long private;
};
```



How Pipe Uses Pages

- *kmap_atomic* the page
- copy *in/out* the page

•••

```
static ssize_t
pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) {
```

```
// in copy_page_to_iter_iovec
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
from = kaddr + offset;
left = copyout(buf, from, copy);
...
```


```
}
```

```
static ssize_t
pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
{ ...
    // in copy_page_from_iter_iovec
    kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
    to = kaddr + offset;
    left = copyin(to, buf, copy);
    ...
}
```



How Pipe Uses Pages

- *kmap_atomic* the page
- copy *in/out* the page
- kmap_atomic is page_address





How Pipe Uses Pages

- *kmap_atomic* the page
- copy *in/out* the page
- kmap_atomic is page_address
- page_address
 - equals (page<<SHIFT)+OFFSET
 - SHIFT is fixed
 - **OFFSET** is also **fixed** on ARM64


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
#define page_address(x) page_to_virt(x)
#define page_to_virt(x) __va(PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(x)))
#define __va(x) ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET))
#define PFN_PHYS(x) ((phys_addr_t)(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)</pre>



Achieving Kernel Arbitrary R/W


- Given a kernel address
 - Calculate the its page
 - Calculate the offset
 - Overwrite the *pipe_buffer* with calculated data
- *Read/Write* by reading/writing the pipe







Escalating Privilege On Pixel 6



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Samsung's KNOX

- Samsung has customized protection for their kernel --- KNOX
- KNOX protects cred integrity





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






- Samsung has customized protection for their kernel --- KNOX
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




Samsung's KNOX


- Samsung has customized protection for their kernel --- KNOX
- KNOX protects cred integrity
- cred object is read-only, uid field is read-only








- Cross-checking between *task* and *cred*
- Integrity is validated at syscall entry







- Cross-checking between *task* and *cred*
- Integrity is validated at syscall entry
- How to prevent the cred is forged?






- How to prevent the cred is forged?
 - Checking if the *cred* is from *cred_jar_ro/tsec_jar* slab








- How to prevent the cred is forged?
 - Checking if the *cred* is from *cred_jar_ro/tsec_jar* slab
 - This check is weak which could by bypassed









Bypassing KNOX

- Forging a *root cred* with correct references
- Tampering the *slab_cache* of the forged cred's page





Escalating Privilege On S22







- io_uring is a huge attack surface not only to desktop but also to AOSP
- *Restricting* io_uring on Android doesn't seem enough
- Object spray is not the only exploit option, try **DirtyPage(**page spray)!
- Android kernel exploitation with *DirtyPage* is simple!

https://github.com/Markakd/bad_io_uring @Markak_ https://zplin.me